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Abstract
This paper presents a non-cooperative evolutionary model to explain the widespread
diﬀusion of lifelong monogamous families. The essential condition, unique to hu-
mans, is the overlap of children of diﬀerent ages. Under this condition, together with
the salience of paternal investment and fatherhood uncertainty, monogamy attains a
greater survivorship than serial monogamy and polygyny. This result is robust to a
number of extensions, including the presence of kin ties, resource inequality, group
marriage, and the risk of adult mortality.
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1. Introduction
A large scientiﬁc literature shows that humans have formed and lived in a wide variety of
sexual organizations, from monogamy to serial monogamy and polygyny. It is interesting
that, among humans, long-term monogamous relationships are pervasive. In this paper we
ask why this is the case. Speciﬁcally, we explore the question of eﬃciency of diﬀerent family
conventions formulating a simple game-theoretic evolutionary model in which individuals
care only for the propagation of their own genes into future generations. Our main ﬁnding
is that monogamy is the most eﬃcient family conﬁguration. The essential force behind
this result, which is unique to humans, is the overlap of children of diﬀerent ages.
To capture the eﬀect of this force, we develop a game-theoretic, overlapping generations
model, in which paternal investment and uncertain paternity play also a key role. In the
model, hunter-gatherers live for ﬁve periods, the ﬁrst two as children, when they rely on
parental investment, and the last three as adults. Opposite-sex adults mate and have
children, all striving to maximize the expected number of their own oﬀspring. Adult men
allocate their resources into hunting, mate guarding, and casual (or extra-marital) sex.
Adult women instead feed their progeny with the food they receive from men.1 The model
ﬁts not only primeval societies but also other environments in which women must rely on
paternal provisioning to raise their oﬀspring.
We characterize stationary symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria for a range of family
conventions. Life long monogamy is shown to be the most eﬃcient family convention when
compared to the other family types under analysis.2 To understand this result, consider
for simplicity the comparison with serial monogamy. In a monogamous environment a
man protects his paternity by guarding and giving food to the same woman during his
entire adulthood. In the serially monogamous convention instead a man does not keep the
same partner from one period to the next, and thus in a given period he has children to
support from more than one woman. The eﬃciency diﬀerence between these two family
types arises because mothers redistribute food among their oﬀspring. If a woman receives
food from two diﬀerent men, there is a free-rider problem whereby each man realizes that
his contribution to his children will be shared with other children who are most likely not
his.3 Thus, every man will shift more of his resources toward extra-marital (casual) sex
and consequently toward guarding, which are both socially wasteful activities. Life long
monogamy is more eﬃcient precisely because it is socially less wasteful and, by allowing
individuals to channel more resources to child provisioning, it delivers a higher rate of
1All our results hold true even if we relax this full specialization assumption.
2Greater eﬃciency here means that the monogamous family grows faster than the other family conven-
tions.
3Private underprovision of public goods is a standard result (Becker 1981/1991; Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian 1986). In Weiss and Willis’s (1985) model of divorce, the free-rider problem is between former
spouses who cannot verify each others’ allocative decisions. In our model instead it is between unrelated
men who cannot write down binding veriﬁable contracts.
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population growth.
Similar considerations apply to the case of polygyny, where one man has multiple oﬃcial
partners to whom he provides food at the same time. Matched males have to defend their
paternity claims from the harsh intrasexual competition of the unmatched men who spend
their entire endowment on cheating, free riding on the food supplied by the matched males.
In one of the extensions of the model, we establish that, in equilibrium, altruistic
ties (i.e., food transfers among siblings, which are eﬃciency enhancing) occur only in the
context of monogamy and not in the context of the other family conventions. Monogamy
is thus a family conﬁguration in which an adult man values his siblings because they
provide him with the assurance that some of his genes will survive into future generations.
In another extension, we discuss the role played by the possibility of adult mortality.
Although it is possible that an unanticipated risk of adult mortality weakens the eﬃciency
advantage of lifelong monogamy, monogamy is less eﬃcient only if we are willing to admit
implausibly high adult mortality rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 links our contribution to some
of the most relevant studies in the literature. Section 3 develops our model of family
formation. Focusing only on monogamy and serial monogamy, Section 4 establishes the
existence of the two respective Nash equilibria, compares them, and analyzes their stability.
Section 5 examines polygyny (including the case in which there is heterogeneity in male
endowments) and extends the model to allow for kin ties among siblings. It also discusses
group marriage as an alternative family structure, considers the presence of the risk of adult
mortality, and provides an interpretation of family conventions as social norms. Section
6 concludes. The proofs of the key results are in the Appendix. A thorough discussion
of the main assumptions that underpin the model and the proofs of additional results are
reported as supplementary material in the online appendix.
2. Related Literature
Since Becker’s pioneering works (1973, 1974, and 1981/1991), the family has become a
prominent area of investigation among economists.4 Becker (1973, pp. 818–820) em-
phasizes the importance of own children as the explanation of why men and women live
together in an environment in which there is complementarity of male and female time in-
puts in production. Because own children are important, the notion of uncertain paternity
is implicitly called upon in order to justify why unions of several men to one or several
women are uncommon. In Becker’s analysis, however, men are not allowed to respond
to fatherhood uncertainty (for example with the introduction of implicit contracts or with
guarding), and all non-monogamous unions are essentially assumed to be less eﬃcient than
monogamous partnerships.
4See Bergstrom (1996), Weiss (1997), Lundberg and Pollak (2007), Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss
(2014).
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Somewhat closer to our approach is a set of studies that emphasize the importance
of fatherhood uncertainty. These include Edlund and Korn (2002), Edlund (2006), Saint-
Paul (2008), and Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2011). But, unlike ours, these papers rule out
casual sex and mate guarding. Rather, they underline the explicit or implicit transfers
that take place between a man and a woman engaged in sexual reproduction (as in the
case of legal marriages, which are seen as a contractual form of establishing paternity
presumption and custodial rights to the man), and examine their consequences in terms
of, for example, the matching patterns in marriage markets and the dynamics of human
capital accumulation, and in response to environmental changes that might have altered
the demand for marriage (e.g., the introduction of oral contraceptives). By looking at
the question of why humans started to form lifelong families, we exclude the possibility of
binding commitments and enforceable contracts and, rather, concentrate on mate guarding
as men’s strategic adaptation to casual sex and uncertain paternity.
Another strand of economic research explicitly incorporates biological considerations
into individual or household behavior (Bergstrom 1995, 2007; Robson 2001; Cox 2007)
as well as economic development and growth (Galor and Michalopoulos 2012; Ashraf and
Galor 2013).5 Siow (1998) investigates how diﬀerential fecundity interacts with market
structure to aﬀect gender roles in monogamous societies. Alger and Weibull (2010) examine
the strategic interactions between mutually altruistic siblings to assess the extent to which
family ties may vary in relation to factors such as output variability and marginal returns
to eﬀort.
Becker (1973 and 1974) shows that polygyny can be explained by male wealth inequal-
ity and gender diﬀerences in the constraints on reproduction. Gould, Moav, and Simhon
(2008) provide an alternative explanation based on the increasing relevance of female hu-
man capital. They argue that educated men increasingly value educated women for their
ability to raise educated children, and this drives up the value of educated women to the
point where educated men prefer one educated partner to multiple unskilled wives. De
la Croix and Mariani (2015) show that income diﬀerentials among and between men and
women can explain the emergence not only of polygyny and monogamy but also of serial
monogamy. In the absence of male and female heterogeneity, instead, we show the evolu-
tionary advantage of monogamy relying on the interactions among the overlap of children,
paternal investment, and uncertain paternity.
Diamond and Locay (1989) stress the role played by uncertain paternity in explain-
ing kin ties. They note that men invest in their sisters’ children even at high paternity
probabilities and that, in many societies, they invest in the children of both their oﬃcial
partner and their sisters. Like in our case, Diamond and Locay’s explanation is that a
male values his sister’s children in part because they provide him with the assurance that
some of his genes will survive into future generations. Our analysis emphasizes an even
5Cox (2007) provides an interesting survey of recent contributions.
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more fundamental link, that is, the link between older and younger siblings rather than
that between an adult man and his sororal nephews and nieces.
We conclude this review by highlighting the salience of our three fundamental conditions
— overlap of children, paternal investment, and uncertain paternity. Many have recognized
the relationship between overlapping cohorts of children and the necessity of protracted
parental care (e.g., Chapais 2008), but failed to emphasize parenting as an activity that
requires parents to support multiple children of diﬀerent ages at the same time. A prolonged
overlap of needy children pushes up the demand for food. This underlies the salience of
parental investment (Trivers 1972), something humans share with non-familial eusocial
insects and the great apes. But chimpanzee mothers can provide for themselves and their
infants, while primeval human mothers could not (Kaplan et al. 2000; Kaplan and Robson
2002). Here is our second key ingredient: women look to men in order to make up their
energy (or resource) deﬁcit.
Fatherhood uncertainty is also not unique to humans, as it is shared, for example, by
all males of mammal species in which female ovulation is concealed and fertilization is
internal. But most of these other species do not form long lasting families (e.g., Emlen
1995). In the case of humans, instead, fatherhood uncertainty must be linked to the other
two previous ingredients. In particular, a man will not have an incentive to invest unless he
has a relatively high conﬁdence in his paternity. When fatherhood is uncertain, a man must
resort to guarding his opposite-sex partner(s) if he wishes to reduce the chances that other
males steal his paternity and wants to enhance conﬁdence in his biological association with
the children he feeds (Hawkes, Rogers, and Charnov 1995).6 Our theory therefore is based
on the combination of these three components to explain the emergence of monogamy.
3. The Model
A. Setup
Consider an overlapping generations model in which identical men and identical women
live for ﬁve periods. The ﬁrst two periods deﬁne childhood, during which individuals are
infertile, unproductive, and dependent. Individuals are infertile also in the last period
when they are old. The remaining two periods deﬁne adulthood and are the centre piece
of our analysis. In each of these periods (labeled 1 and 2), opposite-sex individuals from
the same cohort are matched to have children. Agents are programmed to maximize the
propagation of own genes into future generations.
In each period 1 and 2, a man splits his resource (time or energy) endowment into
three activities: (a) hunting, which provides food necessary for child survival; (b) mate
6Even in contemporary general populations, nonpaternity rates seem to be non-negligible. Baker and
Bellis (1995) report a worldwide median nonpaternity rate of 9 percent from a sample of ten studies. In
a meta-analysis of 67 studies, Anderson (2006) shows that nonpaternity rates vary from 2 to about 30
percent.
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guarding, which increases the probability that the children he supports carry his genes;
and (c) cheating or casual (or extra-marital) sex, which increases the chance that his genes
are represented in the next generation’s gene pool. Women are carers and have monopoly
power to allocate the food they receive from their partners among their children.7 The
food a woman receives from one man is a perfect substitute of the food she receives from
another man. In the last period of life (labeled 3), men are only food providers because
they (as well as all the women in their cohort) are no longer fertile and thus do not engage
in guarding and cheating.8
There are two distinct types of sexual activity in the model. One is within the marital
environment and entails a food-for-sex type of exchange between partners. The other type
of sex (what we interchangeably call “casual” or “extra-marital” sex) occurs outside the
marital bond and does not involve any food transfer from men to women. The asymmetry
with which the two types of sex are characterized is driven by the diﬀerential reproductive
success of men and women (Bateman 1948): a male’s reproductive success is not limited
by his ability to produce sex cells but by his ability to fertilize eggs with these cells, while
a female’s reproductive success is not limited by her ability to have her eggs fertilized but
by her ability to produce eggs.9
Our goal is to characterize sexual conﬁgurations (or conventions). A convention speci-
ﬁes the matching protocol between men and women, i.e., it deﬁnes the women with whom
a man can have a food-for-sex exchange. Within a convention, individual actions are pro-
grammed to allocate resources optimally given the actions of other individuals. This leads
to equilibrium within a convention. An eﬃcient convention is one with the highest (pop-
ulation) growth rate. Genes therefore manifest themselves in the processes that underpin
both individual survivorship and sexual organization of the family.10
7This full gender specialization in home and market tasks echoes Becker (1981/1991). Interestingly,
for hunter-gatherer societies, Robson and Kaplan (2006) provide convincing evidence according to which,
after taking own consumption into account, women supply 3 percent of the calories to oﬀspring while men
provide the remaining 97 percent. See also Kaplan et al. (2000). Notice, however, that assuming that
mothers are not food providers is done for simplicity only. It is easy to show that relaxing this assumption
does not alter any of our main results.
8All adults (males and females alike) are self-suﬃcient, that is, they have a given endowment of material
resources which is enough for their survival. Without loss of generality, we normalize such an endowment
to zero.
9Much evolutionary research on human mating has emphasized the larger and more direct beneﬁts
gained by men seeking brief sexual encounters outside marriage (Baker and Bellis 1995). Several studies
focus on the costs and beneﬁts of casual sex faced by women (e.g., Greiling and Buss 2000).
10In all family conﬁgurations, individuals care about transmitting as much as possible of their genetic
endowment and not just the traits instructing their oﬀspring to follow a given convention. Put diﬀerently,
the intrasexual genetic diﬀerentiation between individuals within the same convention makes the population
polymorphic. Diﬀerences however are minimal and, at the limit, tend to zero. The model will reﬂect this
feature by treating any interpersonal variation as payoﬀ irrelevant (one exception is in subsection 5.A,
where genetic diﬀerences are allowed to be revealed in terms of inequality in male resource endowments).
In a stable long-run evolutionary environment, this provides an important benchmark. But, as mentioned
in footnote 15, the degree of polymorphism is irrelevant for our results and the assumption is then without
lack of generality.
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To highlight the key point of the paper, we formally consider two mutually exclusive
conventions: (a) monogamy, denoted by CM , where a female is matched with the same
male in periods 1 and 2; and (b) serial monogamy, denoted by CS, where each female is
matched with a male in period 1 and another male in period 2.
It is useful to see how our three basic components are embedded in this setup. First, the
overlapping generations structure with two childhood periods gives us the simplest way to
capture the overlap of needy children. Second, full gender specialization is an extreme (but
harmless) assumption to emphasize the salience of paternal investment. Third, guarding
is the direct result of fatherhood uncertainty.
B. Technologies and Actions
Let gt denote the amount of resources a man devotes to guarding his mate(s) in period t,
t=1, 2, kt be the amount he spends in casual sex, and k̂t the average amount of resources
spent on cheating by all other men in period t. The probability that guarding is successful
is given by Π(gt, k̂t) and the probability that an adult man’s guarding is not successful is
1−Π(gt, k̂t).
Assumption 1. The function Π exhibits the following properties: (i) Πg(g, k) > 0,
Πk(g, k)< 0, for all k > 0 and g > 0; (ii) Πgg(g, k)< 0, Πkk(g, k)> 0, for all k > 0 and
g > 0; (iii) Π(g, 0)=1 for any g > 0, Π(0, k)=0, for all k≥ 0; (iv) limg→0Πg(g, k)=+∞,
for all k>0; and limk→0Πk(g, k)=−∞, for all g>0; (v) there exists a twice diﬀerentiable
mapping P : R+→R+ such that:
Π(g, k) = P ◦ γ(g, k), where γ(g, k) = g/(g + k) for all g, k>0. (1)
Assumption 1(i)–(iv) states standard regularity conditions according to which Π is
increasing and concave in g and decreasing and convex in k. With Assumption 1(v), which
is introduced just for simplicity, Π is parameterized in such a way that the probability of
successful guarding is a function of the proportion of resources devoted to guarding relative
to the total resources spent on guarding and cheating.11 The function γ in (1) belongs to
the class of so called Tullock contest success functions, which have been extensively used
in the economics of contests and conﬂict (Nti 1997; Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas 2007; Konrad
2009) and in evolutionary biology in similar contexts to ours (Hawkes, Rogers, and Charnov
1995; Gavrilets 2012).12 Assumption 1 guarantees that, for any given level of guarding,
the likelihood of paternity is inversely related to the average level of casual sex of all other
men.
11It is easy to verify there exists an open set of functions satisfying conditions (i)-(v) of Assumption 1.
An example of a class of such functions is given in the Appendix.
12A problem with γ is that it is not deﬁned at (0, 0) and the function cannot be extended continuously
to that point. A customary way to circumvent this discontinuity is to deﬁne the function γa, with the
parameter a > 0 so that γa(g, k) =
g
g+k+a , and to consider the limit as a → 0.
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Child survival is stochastic and depends only on the amounts of food children receive
during the ﬁrst two periods of life. These amounts are denoted by u and v respectively.
The expected number of children of a given cohort who survive into adulthood is thus
given by F (u, v). The function F is assumed to satisfy the following conditions.13
Assumption 2. The function F has the following properties: (i) F is increasing and
strictly concave; (ii) F (0, v) = F (u, 0) = 0; (iii) limu→0 Fu(u, v) = +∞ for all v > 0 and
limv→0 Fv(u, v)=+∞ for all u>0; (iv) Fuv>0 for all u>0 and v>0; (v) F (u, v)=F (v, u).
Through Assumption 2(i)–(iii), F shares a number of properties with a standard neo-
classical production function. Assumption 2(iv) ensures that F is supermodular, which
in our context is rather natural and amounts to the dynamic complementarity property
discussed by Cunha and Heckman (2007). Finally, Assumption 2(v), which is invoked for
analytical convenience, imposes a symmetry condition on the timing eﬀect of parental in-
vestment on survivorship: that is, the probability that a child survives with transfer u in
the ﬁrst period of childhood and v in the second is the same as the survival probability
obtained when the time order of the transfers is reversed to v ﬁrst and u second. This, in
the context of the skill formation model proposed by Cunha and Heckman (2007), implies
that early and late childhood investments are equally critical and equally sensitive.
An adult man is productive only in periods 1 and 2 and can store food from period
to period at no cost. Let x1 and x2 be the time or energy equivalent amounts of food a
man transfers to the mother of his ﬁrst-period children in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
Similarly, he gives y2 and y3 to the mother of his second-period children in periods 2 and
3. A male then will face the following lifetime resource constraint
ω =
2∑
t=1
(
gt + kt + xt + yt+1
)
, (2)
which is deﬁned over the entire adulthood period.14 Each man is endowed with ω units of
resources (time or energy), that can be allocated either to seek paternity, or to engage in
casual sex, or to hunt and provide food to his mate. The exact timing of such decisions
is irrelevant, except that guarding and cheating will not be carried out in the last period
because all adults of the same generation (men and women alike) are no longer fertile.
A mother then allocates the food she receives in a given period among her oﬀspring.
13For analytical convenience only, we assume that the actual death of children born in a given period
can occur only after the two periods of childhood at the beginning of the adulthood stage. Thus, F can
be interpreted as the number of children who are expected to reach adulthood as fertile and productive
individuals. All children reach the adulthood stage but, without adequate parental investment, they will
be unﬁt to mate and (re-)produce. The model also abstracts from other features which are not essential
for our results to hold, such as economies of scale in food production.
14For simplicity, expression (2) assumes the possibility of free storage and borrowing. However, provided
that men are less productive in their last adult period, only saving but not borrowing will occur in
equilibrium.
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This allocation is straightforward in period 1, when she gives all the food she receives, x1,
to her ﬁrst-period children. Similarly in period 3 she also cannot aﬀect the amount of food
supplied by the male to the second-born for her children’s second stage of childhood, y3.
In period 2 instead she distributes food across two cohorts of children. For m∈ (0, 1), the
amounts of food she allocates to her ﬁrst-period and second-period children are thus given
respectively by mR and (1−m)R, where R = x2+y2 is the total amount of food she receives
from her partner(s) in period 2.
We next specify the payoﬀ structure for each convention separately. The ‘hat’-notation
is used to indicate variables that are not under the player’s control.
C. Payoﬀs
Adult Man in the Monogamous Convention — A monogamous man is programmed to
select g1, k1, x1, g2, k2, x2, y2, and y3 to maximize
1
2
Π
(
g1, k̂1
)
F
(
x1, m̂(x2 + y2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“ﬁrst period children”
+
1
2
Π
(
g2, k̂2
)
F
(
(1− m̂)(x2 + y2), y3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“second period children”
+
1
2
[
1− Π(ĝ1, k1)]F(x̂1, m̂(x̂2 + ŷ2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
“ﬁrst period casual sex”
+
1
2
[
1− Π(ĝ2, k2)]F((1− m̂)(x̂2 + ŷ2), ŷ3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
“second period casual sex”
(3)
subject to (2) and nonnegativity constraints 0≤g1, k1, x1, g2, k2, x2, y2, y3. The ﬁrst term in
(3) indicates the contribution to the man’s payoﬀ from ﬁrst period oﬀspring. These children
are genetically related to the adult male with probability 1
2
Π(g1, k̂1), while F
(
x1, m̂(x2 +
y2)
)
represents the expected number of children surviving the ﬁrst and second periods of
childhood. When casual sex is arbitrarily close to zero, then Π(g1, k̂1)=1 and the degree
of genetic relatedness with own child will boil down to the usual coeﬃcient r = 1
2
. The
same considerations apply to the second term which captures the payoﬀ obtained by a man
through his second period oﬀspring.15
The last two terms in (3) refer to the payoﬀ a male can obtain from casual sex. With
probability 1−Π(ĝt, kt), t=1, 2, he is the “unoﬃcial” father of other children who will not
be supported by him. They instead receive food by the oﬃcial mate of the mother and the
cheating male does not have control over such transfers.
Adult Man in the Serially Monogamous Convention — Taking into account that the female
he guards already has (or will eventually have) children with a diﬀerent male, a serially
monogamous man is programmed to allocate g1, k1, x1, g2, k2, x2, y2, and y3 in order to
15Notice that all our subsequent results hold for arbitrary values of r ∈ (0, 1]. This is also the case if
we consider a monomorphic population, where each mother and father are certain that one copy of their
respective alleles is transmitted to their children, something we have assumed away (see subsection 3.A).
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maximize
1
2
Π
(
g1, k̂1
)
F
(
x1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“ﬁrst period children”
+
1
2
Π
(
g2, k̂2
)
F
(
(1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), y3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“second period children”
+
1
2
[
1− Π(ĝ1, k1)]F(x̂1, m̂(x̂2 + ŷ2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
“ﬁrst period casual sex”
+
1
2
[
1− Π(ĝ2, k2)]F((1− m̂)(x̂2 + ŷ2), ŷ3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
“second period casual sex”
(4)
subject to (2) and the usual nonnegativity constraints. This formulation acknowledges
that, from the viewpoint of a given male in period 2, the woman he guarded in the ﬁrst
period receives x2 from him and ŷ2 from the male who guards her in period 2 and with
whom she begets her second period oﬀspring. The opposite occurs for the mother of his
second period children.
Adult Woman — A woman allocates food to her progeny. The food is given to her by her
oﬃcial partner(s), i.e., the men who guard her. She cannot inﬂuence the amount of food
given in her ﬁrst adult period, x̂1, nor the amount of food received by children in the third
period, ŷ3. Her problem is thus to determine the food allocation, m, in the second period
to maximize her own payoﬀ
1
2
F
(
x̂1,m(x̂2 + ŷ2)
)
+
1
2
F
(
(1−m)(x̂2 + ŷ2), ŷ3
)
, (5)
while taking males’ decisions as given. Since she has no uncertainty about her motherhood,
the degree of genetic relatedness to each of her children is 1
2
.
It is instructive to reiterate that individual payoﬀs (3)–(5) account for the fact that
men have a reproductive comparative advantage to access extra-marital sex as opposed to
women. Our model reﬂects this gender asymmetry in the reproductive beneﬁts of extra-
marital sex by making casual sex payoﬀ relevant for men and normalizing its net beneﬁts
for women to zero.16
D. Stability
As it has become common in evolutionary models (e.g., Kondrashov 1988; Perry, Reny,
and Robson 2015), our analysis of stability combines the notions of individual selection
and group selection. A family conﬁguration cannot exist unless a group of opposite-sex
individuals follow its norms. We assume therefore that a mutation to a new convention
must be done by a small group of individuals (with an equal number of men and women)
16An interpretation of this gender asymmetry is that, even if women did not willingly engage in extra-
marital sex, men resorted to rape (Thornhill and Palmer 2000). Rape might have been pervasive in
ancestral populations. In a study of 186 contemporary societies in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,
Broude and Greene (1976) show that in one-quarter of societies, rape is accepted or ignored and in another
30 percent is only mildly disapproved or ridiculed.
10
who separate from the rest of the population (and, say, move to another “island” or form
a diﬀerent “village”) and interact only among themselves. We introduce this assumption
only for simplicity. Assuming that mutants interact with incumbents will add complexity
to the model but will not aﬀect our main result.
Within a speciﬁc family conﬁguration, each individual is programmed to act optimally
given the strategies adopted by other agents. That is, the allocation of resources selected
by individuals is a Nash equilibrium, and a Nash allocation proﬁle is attached to every
family structure. A family convention Cj is evolutionarily stable if it resists the invasion
of a (small) group of deviators who adopt an alternative convention Cj′ , j′ 	= j. In other
words, the conﬁguration with the highest population growth is the conﬁguration that is
evolutionarily stable, precisely because it will take over the other conﬁguration in the long
run.
4. Monogamy and Serial Monogamy
A. Equilibria
Let us now consider one family convention at a time, and compute the corresponding
survival rate. We focus on pure Nash equilibria and adopt the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition of Equilibrium. An equilibrium (Cj, σ∗j ), j=M,S, is a family convention Cj
and a strategy σ∗j , with σ
∗
j =(m
∗, g∗1, k
∗
1, x
∗
1, g
∗
2, k
∗
2, x
∗
2, y
∗
2, y
∗
3)j, such that σ
∗
j is a pure Nash
equilibrium. That is, given Cj, the equilibrium strategy is a ﬁxed point in actions, whereby
each man maximizes his own payoﬀ and each woman maximizes hers, given the partner’s
actions as well as the actions of everyone else.
We start with a characterization of the equilibrium in the life long monogamy and then
present the serially monogamous case.17
Proposition 1. In the monogamous family conﬁguration, there exists a unique interior
Nash equilibrium (CM , σ∗M) with the equilibrium strategy σ∗M characterized by m∗ = 12 ,
g∗1=k
∗
1=g
∗
2=k
∗
2, and x
∗
1=y
∗
3=
x∗2+y
∗
2
2
.
Proposition 1 shows that, in equilibrium, a monogamous mother splits resources equally
between the two cohorts of her children and both cohorts will receive equal amounts of food
in each of their childhood periods, regardless of birth order. As a result of the concavity
and symmetry of the F function, this is in fact the only eﬃcient allocation of the total
amount of food provided by males. An adult male will devote an equal fraction of his
resource endowment to guarantee paternity of both cohorts of his children in periods 1 and
17We should point out that in the monogamous family convention as well as in the serial monogamy
conﬁguration, there will always exist another equilibrium in which parents provide food only to one cohort
of children, starving the other cohort to death. For instance, m∗=0 is the mother’s optimal response to
x∗1 =0, and similarly x
∗
1 =0 is optimal given m
∗ =0. It is easy to verify that such an equilibrium is not
evolutionarily stable and we thus ignore it.
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2, and this also coincides with the fraction of resources spent on casual sex in both periods.
Repeating the same exercise for the individuals who form families in the serial monogamy
convention leads to the next result.
Proposition 2. In the serial monogamy conﬁguration, there exists a unique interior Nash
equilibrium (CS, σ∗∗S ) with the equilibrium strategy σ∗∗S given by m∗∗= 12 , g∗∗1 =k∗∗1 = g∗∗2 =
k∗∗2 , x
∗∗
1 =y
∗∗
3 and x
∗∗
2 =y
∗∗
2 , with x
∗∗
1 >x
∗∗
2 and y
∗∗
2 <y
∗∗
3 .
There are three similarities between the two equilibria: (a) mothers split their resources
equally among their children; (b) males spend as much on guarding as they do on cheating;
and (c) children from diﬀerent cohorts receive an equal total amount of resources over their
entire childhood.
There is however a crucial diﬀerence in the amount of the transfers by birth order. In the
serially monogamous convention, ﬁrst-born children receive more food in their ﬁrst period
of life, while second-born children receive more food in their second stage of childhood. The
reason for this diﬀerence is simple, and yet crucial. In period 2, when both oﬃcial fathers
of the children born to the same woman have to transfer food to her, they free ride on each
other and supply less food than what they would have done if they were the sole providers.
In the second period, food provision is less eﬃcient from the male’s viewpoint because he
does not have control over the allocation decision of his (current or former) mate, who
could use part of his food provision to care not for his oﬀspring but for the children of the
other man. Hence, every man ﬁnds it more productive to shift more resources to casual
sex, which in turn induces greater guarding in equilibrium.
As casual sex and guarding are socially wasteful activities, the superiority of the monog-
amous convention therefore rests on its greater eﬃciency in allocating resources. This is
formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Survivorship in the monogamous convention is always greater than sur-
vivorship in the serially monogamous convention.
The mechanism underpinning this result is the absence of free riding in the monogamous
convention. Compared to serial monogamy, food provision in the monogamous family is
more eﬃcient. This comes about through two channels. The ﬁrst is that the absence of
free riding has a direct eﬀect on the individual male incentive to hunt and supply food,
because all his food transfers are received by his own oﬃcial children. Conversely, in the
presence of free riding, the serially monogamous man shifts more resources to casual sex
and, since everyone does the same, guarding must go up in equilibrium.
The second channel is a more subtle aspect of the mechanism identiﬁed in Propositions
1 and 2. Monogamous men and women distribute food to their oﬀspring equally in such a
way that the two childhood periods are perfectly symmetric.18 This guarantees an equal
18Recall that the free riding behavior in CS occurs only in period 2, when diﬀerent cohorts of children
of diﬀerent ages overlap.
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food distribution for both cohorts in both periods. Since F is concave and symmetric, this
food distribution turns out to be the most eﬃcient intrahousehold allocation. If greater food
provision is eﬃciency enhancing, each man will have an incentive to shift resources away
from casual sex into hunting, a shift that in turn will reduce the need for mate guarding.
As cheating and guarding are socially wasteful, the equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient in the
monogamy family.
Although we cannot readily extend this result to the contemporary family, it is inter-
esting to note that it lines up well with much of the recent empirical evidence available
for advanced economies, according to which children who live part of their childhood in a
blended (serially monogamous) family have lower educational attainment and experience
worse outcomes later in life (e.g., McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Duncan and Brooks-
Gunn 1997; Ginther and Pollak 2004).
B. Example
We illustrate the results found so far for the special case in which both Π and F are power
functions. In particular, they take the following speciﬁcations:19
Π(g, k) =
(
g
g + k
)α
and F (u, v) = (uv)β, (6)
where the parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1
2
)
are measures of eﬃciency of the guarding
technology and the food provision technology, respectively. With the functions given in (6)
and letting α/β=ρ, it is easy to show that Proposition 1 holds with m∗= 1
2
, g∗1=k
∗
1=g
∗
2=
k∗2=
ρω
4(2+ρ)
, and x∗1=x
∗
3=(x
∗
2 + y
∗
2)/2=
ω
2(2+ρ)
. Similarly, Proposition 2 holds with m∗∗= 1
2
,
g∗∗1 =k
∗∗
1 =g
∗∗
2 =k
∗∗
2 =
ω
2(2+3ω)
, x∗∗1 =y
∗∗
3 =
ω
3+2ρ
, and x∗∗2 +y
∗∗
2 =
ω
3+2ρ
. With such equilibrium
values, the probability of successful guarding is identical in the two conventions and equal
to
(
1
2
)α
. The expected number of surviving children in the serially monogamous family
is 2
(
ω
2(3+2ρ)
)α( ω
3+2ρ
)α
, while the corresponding number in the life long monogamy family
is 2
(
ω
2(2+ρ)
)2α
. In the case in which α= β and ω = 1, it is straightforward to verify that
survivorship in CM is 2
(
1
36
)α
which, irrespective of α, is always greater than survivorship
in CM , where it is equal to 2
(
1
50
)α
. This shows that child survivorship is greater under
monogamy than under serial monogamy.
5. Extensions and Discussion
In this section we discuss a number of important extensions that build on the results of
the previous section. For the sake of space concern we keep the discussion at a minimum.
The proofs of the results in subsections A and C are reported in the online appendix.
19It is easy to verify that the function Π in (6) does not satisfy restriction (iv) of Assumption 1. The
set of conditions in Assumption 1 in fact is not necessary but only suﬃcient.
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A. Polygyny
Polygyny is a family convention in which one man has multiple female partners at the same
time. While this is a widespread family type among many contemporary societies, it should
be emphasized that even in these societies the vast majority of unions are monogamous.20
Previous studies have typically explained the emergence of polygyny through either dif-
ferential fecundity between men and women or male inequality in wealth, whereby richer
(and generally older) men tend to have multiple wives at the expense of males with fewer
resources (Becker 1991).21
Our analysis focuses on the role of endowments. We start by considering the case
in which all males have identical resource endowments. This case oﬀers an important
benchmark in a steady state evolutionary environment where interpersonal diﬀerences are
weakened by selection. In this case, the polygynous matching protocol must guarantee
that only a random subset of the homogenous men in the population are matched for a life
long union. Each matched polygynous man will transfer food to all his oﬃcial mates. The
other men instead remain unmatched, and, as a result, they use their entire endowment
on casual sex as they do not have the need to hunt or guard. The ineﬃciency of this
convention is easily veriﬁed. Not only is a positive mass of the male population unengaged
in food production, but those who are engaged in food production devote too much of their
resources to guard against unmatched men, who in turn are busy stealing paternity from
the matched males. Children of polygynous parents must then rely on fewer resources than
their monogamous counterparts.
With male heterogeneity (and identical women), it can be veriﬁed that there exists a
threshold in male endowments such that, when the inequality in male resources is large
enough, polygyny is more eﬃcient than monogamy.22 In general, the threshold depends
on the technological conditions of a convention. In the context of the example of Section
4, it increases as the food production technology becomes more concave (β → 0) and the
guarding technology becomes more linear (α → 1).
B. Group Marriage
Another possible family conﬁguration is group marriage (or cenogamy), in which a group of
women share a group of men as partners throughout their entire adult lives (Ingoldsby and
Smith 2006). In this convention, a man does not know which of the women, if any, bear
his progeny. It is then natural for men to supply food to all the women who, in turn, pool
it together communally and use it to feed their children. As in all other conﬁgurations,
20See, among others, Hartung (1982), Marlowe (2000), Tertilt (2005), and Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson
(2012).
21As mentioned in Section 2, Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008) develop a model in which higher inequality
in female endowments may reduce the prevalence of polygyny.
22A similar relationship between male (income) inequality and type of family organization (polygyny
versus monogamy) has also been stressed by Lagerlo¨f (2005). See also De la Croix and Mariani (2015).
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cenogamous males have an incentive to steal paternity from men in other groups by having
casual sex with outside females, and they also need to exert eﬀort into mate guarding.
Because each man’s best response is to free ride on the other inside men’s food supply, free
riding increases with the size of the group, and eventually food provision will vanish. This
is a classic example of the tragedy of the commons, and monogamy continues to be more
eﬃcient.
One reason why we still observe cases of group marriage in some contemporary tradi-
tional societies is possibly due to the existence of complementarities in the food production
technology (which are assumed away in our setup), whereby a group of males could supply
more food than in the case in which each of them worked alone. The trade oﬀ between
the advantage given by economies of scale in food production and the disadvantage of free
riding will then determine the optimal size of the group.
C. Kinship
Individuals care not only for their own progeny but also for other genetically close relatives
(Hamilton 1964; Knight 2008; Alger and Weibull 2012). While a full treatment of kinship
transfers and their eﬃciency impact on any speciﬁc family convention is beyond the scope
of our paper, we provide a simple example to demonstrate that including kinship in the
model enhances the superiority of monogamy through the channels described above.
We consider an environment in which adult men with identical endowments can make
food transfers to their presumed younger siblings.23 Siblings’ birth order now matters, as
we allow for older siblings to pass resources to their younger siblings. This means that older
males face a diﬀerent optimization program from that faced by their younger brothers. The
Appendix formalizes such programs.
In the context of the example in Section 4 with α = β and when food transfers between
siblings are possible we can show two results (see the online appendix): (a) In serial
monogamy, there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium, in which the optimal food
transfer is zero; and (b) In monogamy, there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium in
which the optimal food transfer is positive and total survivorship is greater than without
kin ties.
Within our model, therefore, in the serially monogamous convention kin ties cannot
emerge in equilibrium (result (a)). The intuition is simple. Because each child has the
same likelihood of survival and because any given man is genetically closer to his own
children than to any other individual in the population (including his half -siblings), it is
optimal for him to provide food only to his own oﬃcial oﬀspring.
For monogamy, result (b) highlights two points. First, as marginal productivity of food
23The opposite transfers (from younger to older siblings) and more complex kinship systems involving
individuals with lower levels of genetic relatedness (e.g., cousins, nephews, and nieces) are expected to be
of second order importance and are thus not considered here.
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is decreasing, positive kin transfers occur in equilibrium since a man ﬁnds it advantageous
to provide food to both his oﬀspring and his (still dependent) siblings for these are equally
genetically close to him. Greater eﬃciency in food provision translates into greater food
transfers, lower levels of extra-marital sex, and lower need for guarding. Second, ﬁrstborn
receive strictly more food from their father in both periods of childhood than in the case
without kin ties. Later born children instead receive less food from their father, and
even after taking into account the positive transfer from their older brothers, their total
resources are lower than what they would have received in a context without kin ties.
This primogeniture eﬀect emerges because fathers, irrespective of whether they made or
received food transfers, internalize the possibility that their ﬁrstborn will support their
younger siblings. By transferring more food to their ﬁrst born children, fathers spread
their investment across children more equally, which, owing again to the concavity of F ,
increases their payoﬀ.24
D. The Risk of Adult Mortality
There are many types of idiosyncratic risk that can be relevant to our model. Here we
discuss whether the possibility of adult mortality makes monogamy less eﬃcient than either
serial monogamy or group marriage.25
With no risk, Section 4 shows serially monogamous fathers invest more in their ﬁrstborn
than their monogamous counterparts in their ﬁrst period of adulthood. Firstborn children
in serially monogamous families could then be better equipped to face their father’s death.
Indeed, in the presence of unanticipated mortality risk, there are conditions under which
there exists a critical probability cutoﬀ above which serial monogamy is socially more
eﬃcient than monogamy. However, numerical computations applied to a speciﬁcation of
the model similar to the example given in subsection 4.B reveal this can occur only if
mortality rates are at least 90%. Our claim is that such a value is implausibly high.26
If instead the risk of mortality is anticipated, individuals in any family convention can
optimally adjust to the risk. We expect that the monogamous conﬁguration will continue
to be more eﬃcient, because of the absence of free-riding among male providers. A formal
analysis of this case is a promising area for further work.
In the cenogamous convention with no risk, the free-rider problem is more severe than in
the serially monogamous convention, and monogamous couples will always achieve greater
ﬁtness. When there is a positive probability of adult mortality, however, the group of
24Several empirical studies based on contemporary data ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with this eﬀect,
with sizeable negative impacts of higher birth order on intellectual development, education, earnings,
employment, and teenage fertility (e.g., Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005).
25See Hill and Hurtado (1996), Hill, Hurtado, and Walker (2007) and Gurven and Kaplan (2007).
26Hill, Hurtado and Walker (2007) discuss a large body of evidence according to which at least 75 percent
of 10-year-olds are expected to survive to an age at which they might become grandparents (age 40, or
roughly double the mean age of ﬁrst birth) in most of the traditional societies for which there are reliable
demographic data available.
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surviving men and women may provide an insurance against the unanticipated death of
one (or more) of its members. The insurance motive is likely to be weak in large groups,
but could be biting in smaller groups. Numerical computations, however, show again that
the probability threshold above which group marriage dominates monogamy must be at
least 50%, which — as in the previous case — is implausibly high. As before, extending
the model to deal with anticipated risk is likely to give monogamy the usual no-free-riding
advantage and increase the probability threshold even further.
Of course a group might insure against other shocks, such as attacks from rival tribes,
better than a household. This sort of analysis is interesting and deserves attention in future
research.
E. Social Norms
It worth stressing that, even though family conventions are assumed to pass through genetic
links, social norms can come into play in our model. Central to our theory in fact is the
observation that, in a world where individuals seek to maximize their reproductive success,
casual sex and mate guarding are unavoidable, and yet socially wasteful. Because of the
ineﬃciencies they generate, cheating and guarding might induce the development of social
norms, beliefs, or institutions that can attenuate their negative eﬀects. One of these is
“religion”. Religions generate moral systems that can aﬀect equilibrium outcomes building
new norms and beliefs that are evolutionarily advantageous while ruling out alternative
goals and beliefs that are not (Wilson 2002).
In this sense our model provides a simple explanation as to why all of the major
world religions have openly condemned a wide range of sexual acts, such as adultery,
and stigmatized the product of extra-marital sex, illegitimate children (Browning, Green,
and Witte 2006), while allowing or encouraging mate guarding, even if this is a socially
unproductive activity. According to our model, reducing extra-marital sex has not only the
direct eﬀect of freeing up resources for food provision but also the indirect eﬀect of reducing
the necessity of guarding. Both eﬀects increase survivorship. On the contrary, forbidding
mate guarding, independently of the diﬃculty of its implementation, will inevitably give
rise to increased cheating.27
27Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Confucianism view the monogamous family
as a practice that lies at the foundation of society (Browning, Green, and Witte 2006). Of course there are
exceptions. Confucianism and ancient Judaism permitted powerful men to have concubines. But children
of concubines were usually stigmatized. Christianity sometimes idealized the sexually abstinent marriage
and, along with Buddhism, commanded celibacy for its religious leaders. Islam permitted, sometimes
encouraged, polygynous marriages. Interestingly, there are only two Qur’anic verses on polygyny. The
ﬁrst is a permission in a very speciﬁc context, i.e., the treatment of orphaned girls whose guardians may
want to marry them to appropriate their wealth. The second imposes strong conditions on men who
intend to marry more than one woman, making polygyny highly unlikely for a ‘righteous’ man (Rashid
Rida 1975). The permission to marry up to four wives is premised only on concerns about the oppression
of orphans (Al-Hibri and El Habti 2006). Polygynous marriages within the Mormon Church are a much
more recent phenomenon, with the frequency of polygynous men as a fraction of all men in the Utah
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F. Contemporary Family
Caution, of course, should be taken before hastening to interpret our results in the context
of the contemporary family. The widespread availability of eﬀective contraceptive meth-
ods has made extra-marital sex substantially less hazardous for women (Guinnane 2011).
Another dimension of caution refers to parental investment in children that, albeit still
crucial in the contemporary family (Cunha and Heckman 2010), has been supplemented or
replaced by the state and the market (Becker 1991; Lundberg and Pollak 2007). Likewise,
endowment and preference heterogeneity could open up new explanations of why mating
strategies other than monogamous bonding may arise over time (Gould, Moav, and Simhon
2008). Yet another dimension is the increased labor force participation of mothers (Goldin
2006). Medical innovations, binding commitments, the market, the state, heterogeneity,
and the greater economic independence of women might inﬂuence the nature of exchange
within families in ways that our model cannot capture.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a new model of the family with uncertain paternity and paternal
investment in overlapping cohorts of children. Despite its simplicity the model delivers
interesting insights about the monogamous family and its stability. Our main result is
that life long monogamy is the most eﬃcient type of family structure as opposed to se-
rial monogamy and polygyny. The mechanism underpinning this greater eﬃciency is the
existence of free riding between males. The same mechanism is valid when we compare
monogamy to group marriage and when we allow for the presence of the risk of adult
mortality.
Another ﬁnding is that altruism between siblings emerges within monogamy. This is
because every man, who is uncertain about his paternity and yet cares about his reproduc-
tive success, values his siblings in part because they provide him with the assurance that
some of his genes will survive into future generations. Although our framework is based
on genetic transmission of family conventions, the model could be reinterpreted to allow
for cultural diﬀusion of family norms.
Population Database reaching a maximum of 18 percent among men born in 1833 and with a reduction of
the frequency of such marriages to less than 1 percent over the next few decades (Moorad et al. 2011).
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Appendix
Proofs
This Appendix reports the proofs of the propositions of the paper. We begin with the proof of
three technical results that will be used to prove the propositions stated in the paper. Throughout
the Appendix, the notation Fi, i=1, 2, indicates the ﬁrst derivative of F with respect to its i-th
argument; similarly, Fij , with i, j = 1, 2, indicates the derivative of Fi with respect to the j-th
argument.
Lemma 1. F1(x1, x2) = F2(x2, x1).
Proof. The symmetry condition on F , so that F (x1, x2) = F (x2, x1), implies that
F1(x1, x2) = lim
h→0
F (x1 + h, x2)− F (x1, x2)
h
= lim
h→0
F (x2, x1 + h)− F (x2, x1)
h
= F2(x2, x1). 
Lemma 2. If F1(x1, x2)=F2(x1, x2), then x1=x2.
Proof. Strict concavity of F implies that for any two points X=(x1, x2) and Y =(y1, y2) we have
F (x1, x2) > F (y1, y2) + (y1 − x1, y2 − x2)∇F (x1, x2)
whenever X 	= Y . Assume x1 	= x2 and let Y =(y1, y2)=(x2, x1). Then
F (x1, x2)>F (x2, x1)+(x2 − x1, x1 − x2)∇F (x1, x2)=F (x2, x1)+(x2−x1)[F1(x1, x2)−F2(x1, x2)]
which is impossible because F (x1, x2) = F (x2, x1) and because of the assumption F1(x1, x2) =
F2(x1, x2). Then x1=x2. 
Lemma 3. If x1+x2 >y1+y2, then either F1(x1, x2)<F1(y1, y2), or F2(x1, x2)<F2(y1, y2), or
both inequalities are true.
Proof. Because x1 + x2 > y1 + y2, then x1−y1>0 and/or x2−y2>0. Let:
Φ(x1, x2) = F1(x1, x2)
Ψ(x1, y2) = F2(x1, x2).
An inﬁnitesimal increase in the value of the images of Φ and Ψ, denoted by ΔΦ and ΔΨ, corre-
sponding to an increase Δ1 in x1 and Δ2 in x2 can be written as[
ΔΦ
ΔΨ
]
=
[
F11 F12
F21 F22
] [
Δ1
Δ2.
]
By contradiction, assume[
F11 F12
F21 F22
] [
Δ1
Δ2
]
>
[
0
0
]
.
We now consider the three possible cases.
Case 1. Δ1 > 0,Δ2 > 0.
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The system of equations
F11Δ1 + F12Δ2 > 0
F21Δ1 + F22Δ2 > 0
implies that
F12Δ2 > −F11Δ1
F21Δ1 > −F22Δ2.
Because all terms are positive, term-wise multiplication of the two equations leads to (F12)
2 >
F11F22, which contradicts the assumption that F is concave.
Case 2. Δ1 > 0,Δ2 < 0.
Since Assumption 2(iv) guarantees that F12 > 0, the inequality F12Δ2 > −F11Δ1 can never be
satisﬁed because the left-hand term is negative and the right-hand term positive.
Case 3. Δ1 < 0,Δ2 > 0.
The inequality F21Δ1 > −F22Δ2 can never be satisﬁed because the left-hand term is negative
and the right hand term positive.
Notice the supermodularity condition F12 > 0 is suﬃcient but not necessary. In addition, the
inequalities obtained are for inﬁnitesimal increments Δ1 and Δ2. However, because they hold
everywhere, the eﬀect of a change from x1 to y1 and from x2 to y2 can be obtained by integrating
ΔΦ and ΔΨ over the path from (x1, x2) to (y1, y2). The corresponding changes Φ(y1, y2) −
Φ(x1, x2) and Ψ(y1, y2) − Ψ(x1, x2) keep the same signs as those implied by the inﬁnitesimal
increments ΔΦ and ΔΨ. Hence, the contradiction holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (Monogamy)
Adult woman. The monogamous woman’s is programmed to select z2 to maximize
1
2
[F (x̂1, z2) + F (R̂− z2, ŷ3)]
subject to 0 ≤ z2 ≤ R̂, where z2 is the amount of food she gives to her ﬁrst period children in
period 2, R̂ = x̂2 + ŷ2, and the terms denoted by a ‘hat’ are exogenous to her decision problem.
Because of strict concavity of F the solution is unique. The ﬁrst order necessary condition
associated to an interior solution is
F2(x̂1, z2) = F1(R̂− z2, ŷ3) (A.1)
For x̂1 > 0 and ŷ3 > 0 this condition is necessary and suﬃcient. In this case we denote the
solution as z2 = mR̂, where 0<m<1. Now, Lemma 1 guarantees that if x̂1= ŷ3, then m = 1/2.
Adult man. The monogamous man’s problem is to select x1, g1, k1, x2, y2, g2, k2, y3 to maximize
his payoﬀ function φ given by
1
2
{
Π(g1, k̂1)F (x1, m̂R) + [1−Π(ĝ1, k1)]F (x̂1, mˆR̂)
+Π(g2, k̂2)F ((1− m̂)R, y3) + [1−Π(ĝ2, k2)]F ((1− m̂)R̂, ŷ3)
}
,
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where R = x2+y2, subject to ω=x1+R+y3+g1+g2+k1+k2 and 0≤x1, x2, y2, y3, g1, g2, k1, k2,
and where, for now, 0 < m̂ < 1. As before, the terms with a ‘hat’ are exogenous. The following
ﬁrst order conditions are necessary but not suﬃcient for an interior maximum:
∂φ
∂x1
≡ F1(x1, mˆR)Π(g1, kˆ1) + λ = 0 (A.2)
∂φ
∂R
≡ mˆF2(x1, mˆR)Π(g1, kˆ1) + (1− mˆ)F1((1− mˆ)R, y3)Π(g2, kˆ2) + λ = 0 (A.3)
∂φ
∂g1
≡ F (x1, mˆR)Πg(g1, kˆ1) + λ = 0 (A.4)
∂φ
∂k1
≡ −F (xˆ1, mˆR̂)Πk(gˆ1, k1) + λ = 0 (A.5)
∂φ
∂y2
≡ F2((1− mˆ)R, y3)Π(g2, kˆ2) + λ = 0 (A.6)
∂φ
∂g2
≡ F ((1− mˆ)R, y3)Πg(g2, kˆ2) + λ = 0 (A.7)
∂φ
∂k2
≡ −F ((1− mˆ)R̂, yˆ3)Πk(gˆ2, k2) + λ = 0. (A.8)
Next, let us evaluate (A.2)–(A.8) at the ﬁxed point, which we denote with f∗ = (x∗1, g∗1, k∗1, R∗, y∗3,
g∗2, k∗2). Now, equations (A.4) and (A.5) together with (A.7) and (A.8) imply that Πg(g∗1, k∗1) =
−Πk(g∗1, k∗1) and Πg(g∗2, k∗2)=−Πk(g∗2, k∗2). Assumption 1 implies that g∗1=k∗1 and g∗2=k∗2, which
then lead to Π(g∗1, k∗1)=Π(g∗2, k∗2). From (A.1) we obtain
F2(x
∗
1,m
∗R∗) = F1((1−m∗)R∗, y∗3), (A.9)
and expression (A.3) becomes
F2(x
∗
1,m
∗R∗)Π(g∗1, k
∗
1) + λ = 0. (A.10)
From (A.2) and (A.6) evaluated at the ﬁxed point and (A.10) we obtain
F1(x
∗
1,m
∗R∗) = F2(x∗1,m
∗R∗) = F2((1−m∗)R∗, y∗3). (A.11)
Combining (A.9) and (A.11) we get
F1(x
∗
1,m
∗R∗) = F2(x∗1,m
∗R∗) = F2((1−m∗)R∗, y∗3) = F1((1−m∗)R∗, y∗3).
Using Lemma 2 we ﬁnd x∗1 = mR∗ and (1−m)R∗ = y∗3, while Lemma 3 applied to F1(x∗1, x∗1) =
F2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1) = F2(y
∗
3, y
∗
3) = F1(y
∗
3, y
∗
3) yields
x∗1 = y
∗
3.
With (A.9) this solution leads to
m∗ = 1/2 and x∗1 = mR
∗ = (1−m)R∗ = y∗3.
The unique symmetric ﬁxed point of the ﬁrst order conditions (A.2)–(A.8) is then characterized
by x∗1 = y∗3 = R∗/2, m∗ = 1/2, g∗1 = k∗1 = g∗2 = k∗2 = g∗ and ω = 2R∗ + 4g∗.
Existence of equilibrium. To establish that the ﬁxed point σ∗ is an equilibrium we need to show
that, after ﬁxing the strategies of all players but agent j at σ∗ = (m∗, x∗1, R∗, y∗3, g∗1, g∗2, k∗1, k∗2), σ∗
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is in fact the best response for j. This is not trivial because the problem is not concave. Before
getting into the proof, two remarks are in order. First, the allocation implied by σ∗ is the only
interior solution for (A.2)–(A.8) for player j. This implies that σ∗ is the only candidate for an
interior equilibrium. Second, we stress that the constraints of the optimization problem deﬁne a
compact set for each player i and the objective is continuous. As the exogenous parameters, the
terms denoted with a ‘hat’, are ﬁxed at the ∗-values and kˆ∗t > 0 and ĝ∗t > 0, the ratios g/(g + k̂)
and ĝ/(ĝ + k) are well behaved. The optimization problem then must admit a solution. This is
either the interior solution σ∗ or a corner solution in m, which we now rule out but which we shall
turn to at the end of this proof. Below we consider all other possible non-interior alternatives.
(a) x1 = R = y3 = 0 and g1 > 0 and/or g2 > 0 is suboptimal because it yields a payoﬀ which
is lower than x1 = R = y3 = g1 = g2 = 0 and kt =
ω
2 , t = 1, 2.
(b) x1 = R = y3 = g1 = g2 = 0 and ki =
ω
2 is suboptimal because it yields a payoﬀ of 2[1−
Π(k∗t ,
ω
2 )]F (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) which is lower than the payoﬀ obtained following the strategy σ
∗, which
is 2F (x∗1, x∗2).
(c) R = 0 and x1 > 0 and/or y3 > 0 is suboptimal because x1 = y3 = R = 0 will yield higher
utility (recall that by assumption F (u, 0) = F (0, v) = 0).
(d) R > 0 and x1 = 0 and/or y3 = 0 is suboptimal because limx→0 F ′1(x,R/2) = ∞.
(e) From (a)–(d), we infer that as a best response to σ∗ each individual must set x1 > 0; R >
0; y3 > 0.
(f) Recall that, by Assumption 1(iv), Π(0, k̂t) = 0, with k̂t≥0. Point (e) implies that in man’s
j’s best response to σ∗ we must have gt≥0, t = 1, 2.
(g) Assumption (iv), which imposes Πkt(gˆt, kt)=−∞ for ĝt > 0, rules out the possibility that
kt = 0, t = 1, 2. Indeed, for kt small enough and for all x1, R, y3, g1, g2, kt > 0, the value of
−Πk(gt, k̂t) is large enough so that increasing kt (and decreasing some of the other variables)
increases individual j’s payoﬀ.
(h) Finally, as x∗1 = y∗3 the optimal response of the mother is m∗ = 1/2.
(i) Selecting σ∗ is male j’s best response when all other individuals (men and women) select
σ∗. The same argument holds true for a woman’s best response.
From (a)–(i) we conclude that σ∗ is an equilibrium. QED
As mentioned before, there are always two other equilibria in which m is on the boundary.
Consider the case in which the mother sets m=0. It is easy to verify that the best response of
each man is x1= g1= k1=0. Likewise m=0 is the best response to x1= g1= k1=0. Similarly,
m=1 and x2=g2=k2=0 deliver an equilibrium. As emphasized in the text, these equilibria are
such that parents provide food only to one cohort of children, starving the other cohort to death.
Given the purpose of the paper, we ignore such equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Serial Monogamy)
Adult woman. The ﬁrst order condition associated to the woman’s problem is
F2(x̂1,m(x̂2 + ŷ2)) = F1((1−m)(x̂2 + ŷ2), ŷ3).
For x̂1 > 0 and ŷ3 > 0, this condition is necessary and suﬃcient. Let z2 be the amount of food a
mother gives to her ﬁrst period children. Then her optimal response is
z2 = m(x̂2 + ŷ2),
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where 0<m<1.
Adult man. Assuming 0 < m̂ < 1, the serially monogamous man is programmed to select
x1, g1, k1, x2, y2, y3, g2, k2 to maximize his payoﬀ function ϕ given by
1
2
{
Π(g1, k̂1)F (x1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2)) + [1−Π(ĝ1, k1)]F (x̂1, x̂2)
+Π(g2, k̂2)F ((1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), y3) + [1−Π(ĝ2, k2)]F (ŷ2, ŷ3)
}
,
subject to ω=x1+x2+y2+y3+g1+g2+k1+k2 and 0≤x1, g1, k1, x2, y2, y3, g2, k2.
The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem are:
∂ϕ
∂x1
≡ F1(x1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2))Π(g1, kˆ1) + λ = 0 (A.12)
∂ϕ
∂x2
≡ m̂F2(x1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2))Π(g1, k̂1) + λ = 0 (A.13)
∂ϕ
∂g1
≡ F (x1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2))Πg(g1, k̂1) + λ = 0 (A.14)
∂ϕ
∂k1
≡ −F (xˆ1, m̂(x2 + ŷ2))Πk(ĝ1, k1) + λ = 0 (A.15)
∂ϕ
∂y2
≡ (1− m̂)F1((1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), y3)Π(g2, k̂2) + λ = 0 (A.16)
∂ϕ
∂y3
≡ F2((1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), y3)Π(g2, k̂2) + λ = 0 (A.17)
∂ϕ
∂g2
≡ F ((1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), y3)Πg(g2, k̂2) + λ = 0 (A.18)
∂ϕ
∂k2
≡ −F ((1− m̂)(x̂2 + y2), ŷ3)Πk(ĝ2, k2) + λ = 0. (A.19)
Let the ﬁxed point of this problem be denoted by σ∗∗=(m∗∗, x∗∗1 , g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 , x∗∗2 , y∗∗2 , y∗∗3 , g∗∗2 , k∗∗2 ).
From (A.12) and (A.13), owing to the symmetry of F , it can be veriﬁed that
F1(x
∗∗
1 ,m
∗∗(x∗∗2 + y
∗∗
2 )) = m
∗∗F2(x∗∗1 ,m
∗∗(x∗∗2 + y
∗∗
2 )) = m
∗∗F1(m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y
∗∗
2 ), x
∗∗
1 ).
Provided m∗∗<1, we obtain F1(x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 )) < F1(m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 ), x∗∗1 ), which leads to
x∗∗1 	= m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 ).
Assumption 2 guarantees that F11(u, v) < 0 and F12(u, v) > 0 for all (u, v). This implies F1(u, v)
is decreasing in the ﬁrst argument and increasing in the second and thus
m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y
∗∗
2 ) < x
∗∗
1 .
Similarly, from (A.16) and (A.17) we ﬁnd that
(1−m∗∗)(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 ) < y∗∗3 .
Expressions (A.14) and (A.15) lead to F (x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 ))Πg(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ) = −F (x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 +
y∗∗2 ))Πk(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ), which implies g∗∗1 and k∗∗1 are such that Πg(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ) = −Πk(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ). Similarly,
equations (A.18) and (A.19) yield Πg(g
∗∗
2 , k
∗∗
2 ) = −Πk(g∗∗2 , k∗∗2 ). Using Assumption 1, it is easy
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to verify that
g∗∗1 = k
∗∗
1 and g
∗∗
2 = k
∗∗
2 ,
which leads to
Π(g∗∗1 , k
∗∗
1 ) = Π(g
∗∗
2 , k
∗∗
2 ).
Finally, equations (A.13) and (A.16) give m∗∗F2(x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 )) = (1 −m∗∗)F1(m∗∗(x∗∗2 +
y∗∗2 ), y∗∗3 ). Since in equilibrium the mother selectsm so that F2(x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 +y∗∗2 )) = F1(m∗∗(x∗∗2 +
y∗∗2 ), y∗∗3 ), then m∗∗ = 1/2.
Thus, the ﬁxed point σ∗∗ is characterized by x∗∗1 = y∗∗3 , m∗∗ = 1/2, g∗∗1 = k∗∗1 = g∗∗2 = k∗∗2 .
The existence proof proceed exactly as that used for Proposition 1. Therefore, there exists a
unique equilibrium in which 0<m<1 and in which all men use the same strategy and all women
use the same strategy. In this equilibrium children are treated in a semi-symmetric fashion. As
in the monogamous convention, also here there are two equilibria in which x∗∗t = g∗∗t = k∗∗t = 0,
t = 1, 2. As in the previous convention, we ignore such equilibria. QED
Proof of Proposition 3 (Stability)
Let σ∗ denote the equilibrium values in the monogamy convention and σ∗∗ the equilibrium
values in the serial monogamy convention. By contradiction, assume F (x∗1, x∗2) + F (y∗2, y∗3) <
F (x∗∗1 ,m∗∗(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 )) + F ((1−m∗∗)(x∗∗2 + y∗∗2 ), y∗∗3 ) or equivalently
F (x∗1, x
∗
1) < F (x
∗∗
1 , x
∗∗
2 ). (A.20)
Inequality (A.20) would imply that the total resources devoted to food provision are larger in the
CS convention, i.e., 2x∗1 < x∗∗1 + x∗∗2 . As a result, CS is stable while CM is not. We show that this
leads to a contradiction. Indeed, the symmetric allocation (x∗1, x∗1) is the most eﬃcient way to
use the amount of resources 2x∗1. Since g∗∗1 = k∗∗1 = g∗∗2 = k∗∗2 = g∗∗ and g∗1 = k∗1 = g∗2 = k∗2 = g∗,
it follows that, under (A.20), g∗∗ < g∗.
Using Assumption 1 we obtain that Πg(g
∗∗, k∗∗) > Πg(g∗, k∗). Consequently F1(x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 )Π(g∗∗1 ,
k∗∗1 ) = F (x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 )Πg(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ) > F (x∗1, x∗1)Πg(g∗1, k∗1) = F1(x∗1, x∗1)Π(g∗1, k∗1) and
1
2F2(x
∗∗
1 , x
∗∗
2 )Π(g
∗∗
1 ,
k∗∗1 ) = F (x∗∗1 , x∗∗2 )Πg(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ) > F (x∗1, x∗1)Πg(g∗1, k∗1) = F1(x∗1, x∗1)Π(g∗1, k∗1). Since Π(g∗∗1 , k∗∗1 ) =
Π(g∗∗2 , k∗∗2 ) we obtain
F1(x
∗∗
1 , x
∗∗
2 ) > F1(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = F1(x
∗
1, x
∗
1)
F2(x
∗∗
1 , x
∗∗
2 ) > 2F2(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) > F2(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = F2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1).
Lemma 3 implies that x∗∗1 + y∗∗1 < 2x∗1. A contradiction. QED
A Class of Functions Satisfying Assumption 1
The set of functions Π : R+ × R+ → R+ that satisfy Assumption 1 is non-empty and contains
open and dense subsets in the appropriate topology. For example, consider
P (z) =
1
2
[
zα − (1− z)α + 1
]
where α ∈ (0, 1/2). In this case, it is easily veriﬁed that Π satisﬁes Assumption 1 for all α ∈
(0, 1/2).
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